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INTRODUCTION 
 
There is growing interest in how material objects mediate organizational activities 
(Carlile, Nicolini, Langley, & Tsoukas, 2013; Leonardi, Nardi, & Kallinikos, 2012). Much of 
this interest centers on how artifacts represent knowledge and the effects of this 
representation on the creation, sharing, and use of knowledge as well as the coordination of 
action (e.g. D'Adderio, 2001; Carlile, 2002; Bechky, 2003; Cacciatori, 2012; Jarzabkowski, 
Bednarek and Spee, 2015). In this paper, we suggest that this focus on knowledge can be 
usefully complemented by a focus on ignorance, namely how artifacts mediate organizing in 
the face of what is not known, or of knowledge that cannot be shared. We pursue this line of 
enquiry by looking at the development and use of a specific type of artifact, computer 
simulations, in the context of terrorism insurance. Simulations are mathematical models 
embedded in computer programmes that calculate numerical solutions under a wide range of 
conditions (e.g. Sundberg, 2009; Winsberg, 2003), providing summaries of these results in 
various ways (e.g., charts, graphs, tables, pictures and animations). They extend the reach of 
traditional models to cases in which analytical solutions cannot be easily calculated or 
interpreted; act partly as substitute of physical experiments (Morrison, 2009; Bailey, 
Leonardi, & Chong, 2010; Becker, Salvatore & Zirpoli, 2005); and also mediate stakeholder 
interactions (e.g., Galison, 1996; Dodgson, Gann & Salter, 2007). This focus on ignorance 
provides a new insight into how artifacts, and in particular simulations, can aid decision 
making both within (e.g., Bailey et al., 2012) and between (e.g., Dodgson et al., 2007) 
organizations, and ultimately how they affect the wider organizational processes within 
which they are used (Bailey et. al., 2010).  
  
BEYOND IGNORANCE AS NON-KNOWLEDGE 
 
Ignorance in organizing has been treated primarily as ‘non-knowledge’, in the form of 
either absence or incompleteness of knowledge, or ‘distorted knowledge’ such as for instance 
erroneous knowledge or biases. Consequently, organizational research has primarily seen 
ignorance as a dysfunctional aberration (Davies & McGoey, 2012; Schaefer, 2018) that needs 
to be reduced, corrected or kept at bay (Proctor, 2008; Smithson, 1989). Recently, a growing 
body of research on ignorance in the social sciences (Gross & McGoey, 2015; Proctor & 
Schiebinger, 2008; Smithson, 1989) and organizational studies more specifically (Bakken & 
Wiik, 2018; see also Davies & McGoey, 2012; Roberts, 2013; Schaefer, 2018) has advanced 
understanding by moving beyond Western culture’s traditional disregard for the complexities 
of ignorance (Proctor, 2008; Smithson, 1989). 
This has produced several classifications of ignorance that offer useful ways to 
approach its study. Proctor (2008), for example, identifies three major types of ignorance. 
First, as discussed above, ignorance can be seen as non-knowledge, specifically as a ‘native 
state’ or ‘not-yet-knowing’ (Tuana, 2004). Ignorance in this sense is a powerful motivation 
for the pursuit of knowledge – and indeed the science system is kept alive by a constantly 
renewing pool of ignorance, in which each discovery generates new questions (Merton, 
1987). Second, ignorance can be seen as a ‘lost realm’ that derives from selective choices 
about what to study and what not to study. In this sense, ignorance is a ‘declaration of 
irrelevance’ (Smithson, 1989). Ignorance appears to be here a by-product of knowledge and 
its pursuit. Third, ignorance is an active construct, in many cases as ‘strategic ploy’, as, for 
example in the case of trade secrets, or the selective withholding of information for security 
reasons (e.g. Kutsch & Hall, 2010; Rappert and Balmer, 2015). Within this category, there is 
also ignorance that is enforced for moral reasons, such as privacy, and taboos as a form of 
‘socially enforced ignorance’ (Smithson, 1989). 
 
 
Recent reviews (Proctor, 2008; Smithson, 2008) consequently conclude that 
ignorance is not simply ‘a void’ beyond the limits of current knowledge that waits to be 
filled, but “is a pervasive and fundamental influence in human cognition, emotion, action, 
social relations and culture” that sustains social life from polite conversation to peer review in 
science  (Smithson, 2008: 209). Yet, there have been few studies that link ignorance to 
‘concrete examples’ (Gross, 2007). There has consequently been a corresponding call for 
studies of ignorance as a topic of interest in organization studies (Bakken & Wiik, 2018). In 
this paper, we therefore investigate the role of artifacts not as mediators of knowledge 
creation and exchange as in the previous literature, but as mediators in the organizational 
processes through which ignorance is managed.    
 
SETTINGS AND METHODS 
 
We address the role of artifacts in the management of ignorance via a study of 
terrorism risk simulation models in the context of delivering terrorism insurance products. 
The business of insurance is viable in the grey zone between perfect knowledge of who and 
when will be subjected to a loss and complete ignorance. While statistics is crucial in 
managing ignorance in this gray area, the practice of underwriting is guided by a variety of 
other mechanisms, so that “scientific data on risk are variously absent, inadequate, 
controversial, contradictory, and ignored” (Ericson & Doyle, 2004a, p.137-8). This fact and 
the extensive use of modelling techniques to assess risk make insurance an excellent setting 
for our investigation.  
Given the globally interconnected nature of both terrorism and terrorism insurance, 
during 2016-2018 we conducted 106 interviews with insurers, reinsurers, brokers, modelers, 
governments, intergovernmental organizations, and private-public partnerships across several 
countries. We interviewed those most involved in developing and using terrorism models and 
collected numerous documentary data including reports, internal documents, and various 
media articles. We returned the field in 2018 (and ongoing in 2019) to conduct some 
additional interviews and targeted observations of terrorism modelling and underwriting.  
Our analysis moved from broad sensitizing categories or indexing, to more fine 
grained thematic analysis (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013), to a more interpretive 
theorization of that analysis (Wolcott, 1990). First, we uploaded the data in NVivo11 and 
coded around two broad themes: (1) the flawed nature of terrorism models; (2) use of 
terrorism models. These themes, which sometimes seemed counterintuitive, emerged from 
the data. We therefore turned to the literature, to better inform ourselves on why people might 
use models, even where they acknowledged their flawed nature. This initial analysis became 
the basis for all our following layers of analysis, which are more emergent in nature (such as 
compartmentalization) and reflect the themes raised by interviewees – such as the issues 
surrounding the strategic use of ignorance.   
 
FINDINGS 
 
Industry players generally have little faith in the knowledge embedded in terrorism 
simulation models (hereafter ‘terrorism models’): “I mean have you come across a good 
terror model? Who has one? ModellingCompany1 don't have one. … We don't have one, 
ModellingCompany2 don't have one. Do BrokerCompany1? I don't know. They just don't 
exist.” (Interview). At the root of this negative attitude towards terrorism models is the need 
to deal with terrorist’s ‘adversarial human agency’. Unlike natural catastrophes, terrorism is 
characterized by human agency that aims at defeating defences and at causing as much 
damage as possible. This makes addressing adversarial agency a key issue in modelling, 
 
 
while at the same time bringing terrorism modelling out of the domain of natural sciences, 
into areas where interviewees feel ignorance is fundamentally untamable. As one participant 
explained to us: “I can say that as to the modelling there were huge differences between how 
you modelled the more scientific perils such as earthquake and flood with terrorism. We were 
always the ones that no one understood and no one really kind of trusted, because they said: 
How can you model human behavior.” (Interview)  
As discussed above, insurance tames ignorance processing it as risk, in the form of a 
set of possible events (or ‘states of the world’) with an associated set of losses (‘severity’), 
and probabilities of occurrence. These form the basis of actuarial modelling, including 
models based on simulations such as the one discussed here. However, because the trigger of 
terrorism is human agency, and not the ‘natural’ world, many interviewees perceived the 
estimation of probability to be outside of the realm of ‘science’: “I think people have a view 
of probabilities - but they're not rooted in science.” (Interview). Despite the existence of 
some sophisticated models that take into account expert opinion as well as other publicly 
available information such as the number of plans foiled by security, probabilities are given 
very little credence: “You know, the commercial models, ModellingCompany1 thinks that 
they have a probability, I mean it’s laughable…” (Interview).  
Another critical area of ignorance, which some thought was the fundamental one, 
relates to what constitutes a credible terrorism threat given the current security environment 
and the international situation. “The expertise that's very difficult is what's the latest terror 
threat … The commercial models, I love it because ModellingCompany1 sits there and they 
go well, you know, … we put a ten ton bomb on top of [one of the signature skyscrapers]. 
Well how … realistic is that? … Because getting ten tons of ammonia nitrate or TNT, how 
probable is that in this security world: none at all.” (Interview) 
The difficulty in estimating possible states of the world is linked to a final source of 
ignorance that is distinctive of the terrorism peril: secrecy. Information related to what 
governments believe are credible terrorism threats and the defences against them cannot be 
easily made public, as terrorist would adapt and attempt to defeat them. As one participant 
described: “What you really need is the government to say right, well we think these are the 
credible threats and this is what we're planning against. But … you don't necessarily as a 
government want to reveal what you think it is that you know about the enemy. So it is 
genuinely difficult for government to share that information.” (Interview) 
Despite these misgivings, there is extensive modelling activity in the industry. The 
major modelling companies all offer a terrorism model, and several players in the industry 
have developed their own. This suggests that, despite their shortcomings, models still play a 
role in helping to manage the terrorism peril from an insurance perspective. We show below 
that part of this usefulness derives from the way models make the management of ignorance 
possible.  
 
Using models to manage ignorance: Compartmentalization and workarounds  
 
One implication of the ignorance described above is that the estimates provided by the 
models show a lot of discrepancy and variation, in turn requiring a lot of organizational 
interpretation to use models as basis for action. “Modelling is not a universal one size fits all, 
you know … a lot of it is based on how an individual company perceives the risk and the 
tolerances they set for the risk and how they decide to model that risk.” (Interview) 
One key way in which organizations work through ignorance to develop these 
interpretations is through what we have labelled compartmentalization. Participants generally 
noted that terrorism models are poor tools for (absolute) pricing, as this requires estimation of 
probabilities for the properties of individual clients. However, terrorism models have other 
 
 
uses. For instance, to calculate how much capital they need to hold in reserve, insurance 
companies need to calculate their exposure in the form of a maximum aggregate loss across 
their portfolio. While still limited, terrorism models were considered good enough to estimate 
exposure: “So now the problem with terror is that so far models are not really reliable, 
because when there is a human implication, well you don't know. … what we monitor very 
precisely is our maximum exposure.” (Interview). This enabled industry participants to avoid 
the issue of probabilities “We do a whole heap of scenarios but we've never put a probability 
on any of those because, well we just don't know” (Interview). In this sense, modelling 
appears to be a key tool to compartmentalise ignorance. The use of models allowed actors to 
move from a situation in which terrorism is ‘uninsurable’ because of the untamable nature of 
ignorance around adversarial human agency, to partitioning that ignorance into different 
components that can be dealt with differently.  
In addition, when it came to modelling for pricing purposes, some participants were 
less concerned with the absolute level of pricing than with its relative level – they were 
concerned with ensuring that ‘high risk’ clients payed more than low risk clients, in a 
proportionate way. “Yes, you can't price it from an absolute perspective … but you can do it 
from a comparative basis and say the risk in [postcodeA] is worth X in comparison to what 
it’s worth in [postcodeB]…. But that's what we have to do, we have to make sure that if we’re 
charging somebody at a certain price in a certain place, then that's based on some 
underwriting logic and it’s also fair in comparison to what everybody else … is paying.” 
(Interview) 
These uses of models show that the compartmentalization of ignorance afforded by 
terrorism models enables actors to pursue the selective coupling of modelling to specific uses 
through strategies of accepting or ignoring ignorance. Users of models are able to accept the 
untamable nature of ignorance about probabilities by uncoupling the use of models from the 
activities that are most sensitive to probabilities; absolute pricing. Ignorance about the 
possible states of the world was, by contrast, ignored, with models used to calculate exposure 
in worst case scenarios, which might include very unlikely forms of attack. Having an 
estimate of exposure, in turn, made it possible to calculate a price. So, while the use of the 
model is formally uncoupled from pricing, it still ends up facilitating the calculation of prices 
in a roundabout way through the coupling with the calculation of exposure. This 
compartmentalization enable actors to tackle areas of untamable ignorance in an indirect way 
using these models.  
 
Using models to uncover ignorance and manage ignorance strategically  
 
Models also enable the strategic maintenance of ignorance by acting as filters that 
aggregate information in a way that makes it less sensitive from an anti-terrorism perspective. 
Different strategies can be seen at work in different places. For example, one interviewee told 
us: “So there are some quite tricky issues [for the government to share information with the 
organization], and so one way of getting round it could be for government to just hint and let 
[the organization] crack on ... and make its own deductions and do a whole load of 
modelling, it then shares it with government, government will then not be drawn on whether 
they think that's right or wrong, but will then sort of give a sort of nod and go yes, well we 
think that's in the right direction.” (Interview). In this case, ignorance is maintained by 
supporting modelers to produce a picture whilst not discussing the specifics of threats. In 
another case, a more structural solution was achieved in which the modelling organization 
was a sub-department of the government that had security clearance and held a database of 
potential targets, considered to be security sensitive information, in a secure area. They would 
run their model and then share the results with other stakeholders, but the modelling 
 
 
organization would not allow stakeholders to access the data: “So I give them modelled 
outputs. So they don’t run the model. The model resides here in our secret area… We only 
pass them modelled outputs.” (Interview) 
Inter-organizational discussion about modelling is also a means of uncovering 
ignorance, in the sense of helping certain stakeholders identify areas of ignorance of which 
they were previously unaware. For example, engaging government in discussion (as shown 
above) gives governments a chance to become aware of what they do not know. As one of 
our interviewees explained “There is nowhere in government where they are looking at these 
terrorist events in terms of economic loss. …So [this organization] then have to model the 
type of likely and perhaps less likely scenario, so they can then turn round to government and 
say fine … but understand what that means. Because currently, you know, we would be able 
to cover these events but then there are all those events that would remain outside and you 
would then have to come in and pick up the bill. (Interview) 
In summary, models provide a structured way to engage the government and industry 
in conversation. Such conversations enable the strategic preservation of ignorance, even as it 
allows industry to gain some validation of their modelling assumptions from government. 
Once the modelling is done, these interactions then allowed industry to reflect back to 
government a particular ‘modelled’ way of thinking about terrorism. These iterative 
conversations over modelling enable the uncovering of ignorance in ways that reinforce both 
parties interest in using models, despite their flaws as rational tools (Jarzabkowski & Kaplan, 
2015), as one means of responding to terrorism risk.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The idea for this paper started from a puzzle we encountered in the field: almost 
nobody trusted terrorism models, yet most actors were engaged in either building or using 
them. These findings seemed at odd with much of the organizational literature on artifacts as 
part of expert practices, which focuses on how artifacts mediate the dynamics of knowledge 
(e.g. Bailey et al., 2012; Dodgson et al., 2007; Jarzabkowski et al., 2015). 
There are many possible explanations for the development and use of terrorism 
models even when there is little trust in the knowledge embedded in them. Scholars have long 
noticed that organizations request and produce vastly more information than they actually use 
and have associated this to a Western culture and structural features that privilege projections 
of rationality (Cabantous & Gond, 2011; Jarzabkowski & Kaplan, 2015; Langley, 1989; 
Feldman & March, 1981). From this perspective, we may understand modelling in our 
context, despite its flaws, as a reliance on the ‘technologies of rationality’ (Jarzabkowski & 
Kaplan, 2015; March, 2006) through which managers seek to counteract their ignorance. In 
particular, modelling provides reassurance to stakeholders that they can ‘know’ their risk, in 
the absence of other ways to validate their knowledgeability in relation to that risk; the 
process of decision making via modelling is used as a proxy for knowledge (Cabantous & 
Gond, 2011; Cabantous, Gond, & Johnson-Cramer, 2010; March, 2006). Similarly, work in 
the social studies of finance suggests that the accuracy or veracity of models might count for 
little when they are effective as coordination and communication devices that allow a market 
to function (MacKenzie & Spears, 2014; Millo & MacKenzie, 2009). We saw elements of 
this in our setting, in that potentially important areas of ignorance in the models, such as what 
is a credible threat, were collectively ignored in the interest of making the market work. 
Indeed, the way that models perpetuate ignorance by focusing development upon those areas 
of ignorance that are accepted, over those that are ignored, points to the performativity of 
modelling on actors’ decision making (Cabantous & Gond, 2011), which even inaccurate 
models may be used to drive the development of a market (MacKenzie, 2008). While these 
 
 
explanations have merit in our context, our findings highlight that what models allow actors 
to do in relation to what is not known (ignorance), and the way that interacts with what is 
known or becomes knowable through the model, plays an important role in their usefulness. 
The development and use of simulations models does not simply contribute to the banishing 
of ignorance by generating and spreading more knowledge, but also contribute to the 
maintenance of areas of ignorance for strategic reasons, as well as facilitating the 
development of knowledge in certain areas while contributing to the persistence of ignorance 
in others.  We propose that models generate this dynamic interplay between knowledge and 
ignorance, which in turn supports their role as artifacts enabling action in areas of extreme 
uncertainty.  
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